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The Orchid, the Wasp and the Text: Encountering Bodily Becoming through 
Deleuze and Feminism 
 
La philosophie est la théorie de multiplicités. Toute multiplicité implique des 
éléments actuels et des éléments virtuels. Il n’y a pas d’objet purement actuel. Tout 
actuel s’entoure d’un brouillard d’images virtuelles. (Deleuze 1996: 179)1  
 
Non pas en arriver au point où l’on ne dit plus je, mais au point où ça n’a plus 
importance de dire je. Nous ne sommes plus nous-mêmes. Chacun connaîtra les siens. 
Nous avons été aidés, aspirés, multipliés. (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 9)2 
 
A Philosophy of Flows 
 
This chapter seeks to unpick the philosophy of becoming of Gilles Deleuze, in his 
sole-authored work and in collaborations with Félix Guattari,3 to trace their 
connections to the theorisation of the body in feminist thought, and to unearth therein 
some conceptual grains with which to fertilise my readings of the female body in 
contemporary women’s writing in French. I am hesitant to posit the aims of this 
chapter as forging a solid, unmoving theoretical terrain, or as focusing a narrow lens, 
which would no doubt be illuminating, but which might also restrict the view into the 
literary texts I read. This book is driven by encounters and interactions and, as such, 
does not wish to present readings of texts that are resolutely consigned to a particular 
theoretical grid.4 It might be more helpful, then, to think of this chapter as an attempt 
to spin a web of interconnected ideas – ideas that will fruitfully engage with the 
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corpus of literary works, albeit often in very different ways – as a means of mutually 
enriching both theory and text. 
 
 To begin, some preliminary thoughts on the positioning of Deleuzian 
philosophy, and its contribution to broader trends in French poststructuralist thought 
from the 1960s and 1970s onwards. Like other poststructuralist thinkers such as 
Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, Deleuze’s work is driven by a desire to open 
out new ways to conceptualise language and identity. Poststructuralists seek to move 
beyond both the phenomenological model and its basis in sensory embodied 
experience and the structuralist approach distinguished by the exploration of systems 
of meaning, and want instead to destabilise the very notion of structure. By 
interrogating and breaking down the structures that might attribute certain meanings 
to life in the relation of components to one another, by recognising the insufficiency 
of experience as foundational or stable, meaning itself inevitably collapses. But for 
these thinkers, such collapse should not be viewed in terms of failure, negativity, 
fracture, lack or loss. Rather, the very opening out of thought and resistance to closure 
can be celebrated in that it seeks not to reduce the flux of the real to prescribed unities 
of truth and knowledge.  
 
This openness of thought, and openness to thought, is a key characteristic of 
poststructuralist philosophy. If traditional metaphysical questions about being, 
knowledge and morality were initially displaced by Nietzsche’s death of god, early-
twentieth century thought has nonetheless been characterised by an anxious 
relationship between the individual and knowledge. Poststructuralist thought strips 
certainty away to the extent that the search for knowledge, even within the arbitrary 
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systems of structuralist thought, or the flux of phenomenological experience, is 
replaced not only by a conscious destabilisation of these structures and experiences, 
but of the very place of the subject within them. A recurrent notion that threads 
through the work of poststructuralist thinkers is that systems and systematisations 
inevitably constrain and contain the vitality of existence. Foucault’s genealogical 
investigation of institutionalised structures of power, for example, demonstrates the 
historical and contingent nature of what he terms the order of things. For Derrida, 
such constraints lie not only in historical legacy, but are to be found in the structures 
of language, which serves to privilege certain themes and concepts over others, 
creating a hierarchy of difference: presence over absence, identity over difference, 
masculinity over femininity. In Deleuze’s work, the unfolding of thought and 
language beyond systems and systematisations rests on what might be termed a 
philosophy of dynamism, a ‘belief that “life” is frequently imprisoned and that it 
could be freed’ (Marks 1998: 4). To grasp the immanent flux of ‘life’, for Deleuze, is 
to engage with flows, encounters, rhizomes, multiplicities, differences, nomadism and 
becoming, philosophical paradigms that are seen as liberating rather than 
constraining. Moving beyond the fixity of being, truth and knowledge, the Deleuzian 
celebration of dynamism means that ‘possibility’ itself becomes a key concept. As 
such, his philosophical project is not so concerned with conventional metaphysical 
questions such as ‘what is?’, ‘what can I know?’, or ‘how should I act?’, and 
experiments instead with the vitality of ‘what is possible?’  
 
Philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari, no longer provides a 
simplifying structure or framework through which to understand and interpret the 
universe. It does not involve contemplation, reflection or communication, but gestures 
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towards the concept in a creative act: ‘la philosophie est l’art de former, d’inventer, de 
fabriquer des concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 8).5 Concepts are not there for 
the taking as pre-established forms, nor do they crystallise as facts once they are 
created. A concept implicates itself within itself in touching the flux of difference; it is 
a multiplicity of components, an event rather than an essence (Deleuze and Guattari 
1991: 26; 1994: 21). Concepts do not explain, give meaning or aspire to conclusions, 
then, rather they allow difference to emerge. As Todd May (2005: 20) rather 
evocatively puts it, concepts palpate, in the way that a doctor might palpate the body 
in order to understand a lesion that they cannot see, creating a ‘zone of touch’: 
‘Concepts palpate difference, and by doing so they give voice to it. It is a strange 
voice, eerie and penetrating.’ Deleuzian thought involves being unsettled, and open to 
jolts and disturbances. It is nomadic, it passes and flows across the surface of 
immanence, in the vein of Nietzsche, for whom, as Deleuze writes  
 
À travers tous les codes du passé, du présent, de l’avenir, il s’agit […] de faire 
passer quelque chose qui ne se laisse et ne se laissera pas coder. Le faire passer 
sur un nouveau corps, inventer un corps sur lequel cela puisse passer et couler: 
un corps qui serait le nôtre, celui de la Terre, celui de l’écrit. (Deleuze 2002: 
352-3)6 
 
A philosophy of possibility undercuts codes and invents new bodies within and across 
our immanent reality, bodies of thought and bodily thought that intersect the actual 
and the virtual. As we shall see, a Deleuzian approach to philosophy as flow thus 
holds immense appeal for a project of this kind that aims to open out perspectives on 
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the body in contemporary culture, to think through – or across – the body while 
respecting its suspended becoming. 
 
The Reception of Deleuze in Feminist Thought 
 
The past twenty years have been witness to an explosion of critical interest in the 
work of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, in keeping with Foucault’s (1994:76) 
claim that ‘un jour, peut-être, le siècle sera Deleuzien’.7 Whether we translate the 
‘siècle’ here as ‘century’ or as something akin to an ‘inner circle’ or ‘in-crowd’ (see 
Faubion 1998: xix, xxxix), the scope of thinking about or after Deleuze in academic 
circles would seem to fulfil this prophetic point. And yet, moving beyond the possible 
elitism of the ‘in-crowd’, what has been particularly striking is the range of criticism 
that strives to read Deleuze ‘with’ or ‘and’ something else, something that is either 
perhaps perceived not to be so obviously Deleuzian or that might commonly invite a 
non-Deleuzian, and, perhaps non-esoteric, approach. This is evidenced by the recent 
appearance of journals such as Deleuze Studies and Deleuze Connections, whose 
volumes place Deleuzian philosophy in conversation with various subject areas, 
including politics, feminism, queer theory, postcolonialism, the body, geography, 
space, cinema, performance, art, music and literature.8 My own critical thinking is in 
keeping, then, with a revitalised interest in Deleuze’s work, and in particular with a 
desire to set his thought in motion beyond the confines of the ‘in-crowd’ of French 
poststructuralist philosophy, to bring it into a contemporary realm and to engage it 
with political, cultural and aesthetic debates. 
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Deleuzian philosophy has historically experienced a troubled relationship with 
the work of feminism, compared to other areas of poststructuralist thought, which 
have been mobilised in a great deal of feminist writing from the 1970s onwards. 
While Lacanian psychoanalysis and Derridean deconstruction provided Hélène 
Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva with helpful ways of thinking about the 
place of the female subject within symbolic or logocentric structures, Foucault’s 
groundbreaking work on the history of sexuality has given rise to a wealth of valuable 
critical thinking in feminist and queer theory, most notably the work of Judith Butler. 
However, from the outset, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari have been heavily 
criticised by feminists for a number of theoretical concepts that would seem to 
indicate a disconcerting lack of attention to sexual specificity or a ‘masculinist’ 
approach, and it has taken a great deal longer for feminism to find any value in their 
work. Irigaray has heaped critical coals at these philosophers’ feet, claiming that their 
vocabulary of multiplicity and nomadism necessarily extinguishes any kind of 
specificity, and thus denies women their identities and desires in a dangerous erasure 
of sexual difference. For Irigaray, the collapsing of the subject that Deleuzian 
philosophy entails can be nothing but an impossibility for women, arguing as she 
does, quite rightly, that one cannot take apart an identity which has never fully been 
inhabited in the first place: ‘ne faut-il pas avoir eu au langage et au sexe – aux organes 
– un rapport que les femmes n’ont jamais eu?’ (Irigaray 1977: 139).9 Irigaray further 
objects to the terminology of machines, technologies and assemblages that peppers 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy (in that it signals a technocratic discursive 
tradition which has historically excluded women), and to their elegy of the 
schizophrenic as another minoritarian figure alongside women (as reinforcing a 
damaging association between women and madness, and overly romanticising 
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suffering). Similarly, in the Anglo-American context, feminist thinker Alice Jardine 
(1985: 217) rejects Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy on the basis of the concept of 
becoming-woman, which, she argues, invisibilises female materiality while 
continuing to appropriate the feminine within male discourse. 
 
These are stark and seemingly valid criticisms and I shall return to their 
persistent implications later in this chapter, and, indeed, throughout the book. And 
yet, since the 1990s a variety of feminist and queer thinkers have reassessed 
Deleuzian philosophy as a means to think through contemporary female corporeality 
in terms of multiplicity. Much productive work has been done in this area towards a 
so-called ‘corporeal feminism’, by thinkers who include Claire Colebrook, Rosi 
Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, Tamsin Lorraine and Dorothea Olkowski, among others.10 
In focusing on folding, flux and becoming, my own positions are perhaps closest to 
those of Braidotti and Grosz. Braidotti argues that the relevance of French 
poststructuralism to feminism lies not so much in what it might or might not have to 
say about women, sexuality or the body; of greater importance is its redefinition of 
thinking, and its opening out of the theoretical process towards a creative envisioning 
of subjectivity (Braidotti 1994a: 100). Braidotti’s own work thus projects subjectivity 
as intensive and multiple, ‘rhizomatic, embodied, and therefore, perfectly artificial; as 
an artifact it is machinic, complex, endowed with multiple capacities for 
interconnectedness in the impersonal mode’ (Braidotti 1994b: 162). She repositions 
gendered constructions of subjectivity within the contemporary millennial climate in 
which the body is subject to multiple layerings and interconnections. As she writes:  
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there is no question that what, even and especially in feminism, we go on 
calling, quite nostalgically, ‘our bodies, ourselves’ are abstract technological 
constructs fully immersed in advanced psycho-pharmacological industry, bio-
science and the new media. This does not make them any less embodied, or less 
ourselves, it just complicates considerably the task of representing to ourselves 
the experience of inhabiting them. (Braidotti 2000: 161)  
 
Braidotti thus compellingly argues that the Deleuzian concept of nomadism holds 
great promise, insofar as it offers contemporary feminism a way of acknowledging the 
multiplicity and difference of subjectivity, of occupying different subject positions at 
different times, and of combining coherence with mobility, contingency and 
transformation. Nomadic ruptures or shifts open out spaces for new and different 
forms of agency to be engendered, she argues, and as such they mobilise ‘a creative 
sort of becoming; a performative metaphor’ (Braidotti 1994a: 6). 
 
Elizabeth Grosz also highlights the relevance of multiplicity to a 
contemporary theory of the corporeal subject, and in particular signals the reversal of 
Platonism as a crucial common target shared by Deleuzian philosophy and feminism 
(Grosz 1994b: 190). Grosz presents a persuasive set of arguments that illuminate the 
advantages of a Deleuzian framework to contemporary feminism. These include 
(Grosz 1994a: 180): i) the ‘flattening out of relations between the social and the 
psychical so that there is neither a relation of causation (one- or two-way) nor 
hierarchies, levels, grounds, or foundations’, ii) the refusal to ‘duplicate’ the world 
into real and representation, iii) positing an ‘in-between’ as a critique of binarism, iv) 
the demassification of the entities that binary thought counterposes against each other, 
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and v) the incessant refusal of a single explanatory paradigm. Braidotti and Grosz 
variously draw attention to the ways in which Deleuze enables the rethinking of 
bodily subjectivity as an overlapping between nature and culture, and between 
interiority and exteriority, rather than placing bodies in categories that are pulled back 
to the putative oppositioning of earlier feminist debates around biological essentialism 
or social constructionism. While Braidotti focuses largely on nomadic becoming and 
metamorphosis, Grosz highlights aleatory desire, the Body without Organs, and the 
folding of corporeality, which she figures through the model of the Möbius strip. 
Thinking through Lacan, neurophysiological discourse, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, 
Foucault and Kristeva, Grosz formulates a model of female corporeality that draws 
significantly on Deleuze in its theorisation of the torsion of the body, and in its 
interrogation of the conventional relationship between depth and surface:  
 
The Möbius strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into body 
and body into mind, the ways in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, 
one side becomes another. This model also provides a way of problematising 
and rethinking the relations between the inside and the outside and the subject, 
its psychical interior and its corporeal exterior, by showing not their 
fundamental identity or reducibility but the torsion of the one into the other, the 
passage, vector, or uncontrollable drift of the inside into the outside and the 
outside into the inside. (Grosz 1994a: xii) 
 
The work of these feminist philosophers forges new ground and offers 
stimulating perspectives on contemporary female corporeality in its engagement with 
Deleuzian thought. Moving away from the positions on sex and sexual difference of 
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the second wave that oft give rise to concerns about essentialism, these thinkers 
reconceive female subjectivity within the very terms of dynamism, vitalism and 
possibility that govern Deleuze’s work. However, drawing on Deleuze as a feminist is 
not achieved without some margin of reserve. As we shall see, certain Deleuzian 
concepts and turns of phrase continue to provoke critical consternation for the 
feminist thinker, in particular the contested concept of ‘becoming-woman’, and, as 
such, Braidotti, Grosz and others tend to stress the process of counter-position that is 
involved in Deleuzian feminism, which is invoked as ‘Deleuze and feminism’ or 
‘Deleuze with feminism’. Feminist approaches to Deleuzian philosophy often require 
taking a certain risk on the potential use-value of Deleuze’s thought, rather than 
strictly adhering to its principles. Accordingly, Braidotti (2002: 83) refers to her 
‘nomadic feminism’ as ‘zigzagging through Deleuze and feminism’. And as Jerry 
Aline Flieger (2000: 62) remarks,  
 
like the orchid and the wasp, the relation of Deleuzian thought and feminist 
thought may be ‘mapped’ or interwoven in a kind of productive disjunction. It is 
perhaps neither a matter of window-dressing, masquerade and cosmetic 
solutions, nor of conflict and irreconcilable differences, but a matter of paradox.  
 
In itself, this seems a way of thinking that corresponds to a philosophy of flows, a 
gesture of thought that touches upon difference and allows it to emerge rather than 
strictly encoding it, a encounter with Deleuzian thought, such that Deleuze himself 
might advocate (although, as we shall see, an encounter or dialogue that he might not 
have put into practice himself). The analysis that follows is indebted to the work of 
Braidotti, Grosz and others, which provides a conceptual springboard for my own 
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readings of Deleuze in this chapter. As a feminist literary critic, however, my 
purposes both overlap with and depart from these thinkers. My concern in this book is 
with how reading Deleuze can help us to understand contemporary experiences of 
female corporeality, but also with how reading Deleuze opens out perspectives on 
contemporary expressions of female corporeality. It will be important to hold in view 
here the relationship between body and text. Is there room for more engagement with 
Deleuze in thinking about the female body on the level of the literary rather than the 
literal? Can one take more risks with Deleuze in such a context? And what would be 
the point? I shall return to these questions briefly at the end of this chapter and 
throughout this book. First, however, we will take a closer look at some key areas of 
Deleuzian thought – the philosophy of transcendental empiricism, desire, the Body 
without Organs, notions of becoming, nomadism and difference – in order to establish 
something, at least, of a grasp on their relevance to a theorisation of contemporary 
female corporeality. 
 
Transcendental Empiricism: The A-subjective, the Event and the Fold  
 
Deleuzian philosophy proposes a vital rethinking of the relationship between subject, 
object and universe. In Deleuze’s formulation of transcendental empiricism, the 
subject is not merely repositioned but rather dislocated, allowing a philosophy to 
emerge that is instead shaped around an a-subjective consciousness. The potentially 
negative implications of a-subjectivity for the purposes of feminism are immediately 
apparent. For how can one reconcile the a-subjective with a philosophy or politics 
whose impetus is precisely to emphasise a localisable subject? In other words, if one 
does not have a starting point from which to speak, how can one possibly begin to 
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identify as, for example, a woman? And if one cannot, then, is the entire purpose of 
feminism not rendered futile? My position here is that while the Deleuzian a-
subjective invokes tensions with a conventional feminist politics, it nonetheless opens 
out illuminating perspectives on the folds and flux of consciousness that go some way 
to inform contemporary experiences and expressions of corporeality, even as it may 
be conceived of in feminine terms. As Claire Colebrook (2000: 113) observes, 
questions of sexual difference have traditionally been aligned to a transcendental 
philosophy: ‘the recent debate over sexual difference concerns nothing other than the 
possibility that the gendered subject may not just encounter a world, but that sex 
occurs as a specific relation to the world.’ In countering transcendence, however, the 
Deleuzian philosophy of transcendental empiricism explodes that relationship 
between the subject and the world, and seeks less to provide meaning for the given, 
than to open out responses to what is taken as given. The implications for questions of 
sexual difference will be drawn out over the course of this chapter, but as this section 
will begin to reveal, any kind of theorisation after Deleuze thus requires trying to 
think ‘without the illusion of transcendence’ (Colebrook 2000: 125).  
 
For Deleuze, a major problem in the tradition of Western philosophy emerges 
in that experience is always already imparted to a fixed and pre-existing subject. From 
the moment of the Cartesian cogito, the subject is thus constructed as a ‘plane of 
transcendence’, whereby it is imagined that there is some stable meaning or truthful 
foundation behind that which we create as identity. Deleuze wants to collapse 
Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore I am’ on the very grounds that it presupposes a thinking 
subject that exists externally to the rest of the world. While for Descartes the 
possibility of thought itself proves the existence of the subject, there unfolds for 
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Deleuze a problematic assumption that the way one relates to the world is necessarily 
rooted in knowledge and judgment, that the world exists before the subject as a set of 
facts to be represented. For Deleuze, the flux of the real, or the ‘plane of immanence’, 
is a field of flows of difference, a collection of energies and multiplicities, which lies 
in opposition to the world as mediated through subject and object. Rather than 
ordering experience in a Cartesian manner, then, ideas are instead the effect of 
experience. It is from immanent experience itself that an image of the subject is 
formed, and that the contrasting ‘plane of transcendence’ is produced from the given. 
Deleuze’s philosophy is shaped here by his reading of Humean empiricism, and he 
explains that, ‘Du donné, j’infère l’existence d’autre chose qui n’est pas donné: je 
crois. […] Dans la même opération, et en même temps, je juge et je me pose comme 
sujet: en dépassant le donné. J’affirme plus que je sais’ (Deleuze 1953: 90).11 It is 
important to highlight that the mind receives ideas and connections that create the 
impression of a transcendent subject, and that the subject does not create ideas but is 
constituted by them. Deleuze (1953: 150) thus maintains an important distinction 
between subject and mind: ‘Par lui-même, l’esprit n’est pas sujet: c’est une collection 
donnée d’impressions et d’idées séparées.’12 Humean empiricism entails the 
substitution of a psychology of the mind, in and of itself, by the ways in which the 
mind is ‘affected’ (Deleuze 1953: 1; 1991: 21). The mind is thus not nature, or a 
system, but is identical with the very collection of ideas that exist in the mind, and it 
becomes subjected under the effect of the principles of passion and association. As 
Deleuze (1953: 15) writes, ‘L’esprit n’est pas sujet, il est assujetti. Et quand le sujet se 
constitue seulement dans l’esprit sous l’effet des principes, l’esprit se saisit en même 
temps comme un Moi parce qu’il est qualifié.’13 If the subject is the product of 
principles within the mind, though, it is also the mind that transcends itself. In other 
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words, the mind exists as a collection of impressions and ideas, but it is the repetition 
of connections between these that produces the transcendent subject. The mind thus 
becomes subject through the principles of passion, through its vividness: ‘quand il 
mobilise sa vivacité de telle façon qu’une partie dont elle est le caractère 
(impression) la communique à une autre partie (idée), et d’autre part, quand toutes les 
parties prises ensemble résonnent en produisant quelque chose de nouveau’ (Deleuze 
1953: 151, original italics).14 But further, such repetition and connection result in the 
anticipation of them, producing through the principles of association – contiguity, 
resemblance and causality – the transcendent subject through the fixing and 
naturalisation of the mind (Deleuze 1953: 5; 1991: 24). Belief, then, rests on 
anticipation and invention, and ultimately on turning the given itself into a nature 
(Deleuze 1953: 152; 1991: 133). 
 
Through Hume, Deleuze thus formulates the coming into being of the 
transcendent subject, which his own philosophy of transcendental empiricism wants 
to undermine. In contrast to transcendence, transcendental empiricism refuses to 
attribute experience to a subject, liberating thought from metaphysics, and opening 
out the immanence of experience. The notion of the event, as Deleuze conceives it, 
further dislocates the subject, and it also provides a way to think through the relations 
between the actual and the virtual that underpin his philosophy of countering 
transcendence. Following the Stoics, Deleuze makes a distinction between bodies and 
their corresponding states of affairs, and incorporeal effects. The former can be 
understood in Deleuzian thought in terms of the actual, or the immediate perception 
of experience, whereas the latter can be understood as the virtual. The event is a 
virtual or incorporeal effect. Yet there is a double movement involved in the event 
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insofar as it is actualised in, or attributed to, bodies and states of affairs, while 
nonetheless containing an altogether different, virtual dimension, ‘une part 
ombrageuse et secrète qui ne cesse de se soustraire ou de s’ajouter à son actualisation: 
contrairement à l’état des choses, il ne commence ni ne finit, mais a gagné ou gardé le 
mouvement infini auquel il donne consistance’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 148).15 
This element of the event is virtual insofar as it is distinguished from the actual. But it 
is also real, because, rather than corresponding to the immediate materiality of the 
actual, there remains, in what is not actualised from the event, pure immanence. This 
dimension of the event is thus immaterial, incorporeal and, indeed, unliveable 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 148; 1994: 156). 
 
Though this aspect of the event is described as unliveable, in countering 
transcendence, one must nonetheless aspire to be worthy of the event. Perspectives on 
the event can only be established in an acceptance of it as separate from the subject in 
its transcendent form, in other words, in counter-actualising the event. Again, Deleuze 
follows the Stoics in his discussion of the ethics of amor fati: being worthy of an 
event, recognising its existence before the subject rather than its relation to the 
subject. Here he refers to Joë Bousquet’s notion of the ‘wound’, which proposes that 
suffering should not be experienced as something that happens to the subject: ‘Ma 
blessure existait avant moi, je suis né pour l’incarner’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 
80).16 Rather than suffering an event, then, one rather aspires to the event that 
supersedes the subject. Being born to embody the event involves accepting the wound 
in its non-actualised form, and acknowledging its virtual immanence. As such, being 
born to embody the wound paradoxically involves being able to disembody it, to 
counter-actualise it by affirming the dimension of it that slips away from the actual. In 
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another example of counter-actualising the event, Deleuze proposes that the abject 
desire ‘to be loved’ might be substituted with the power ‘to love’. This is not merely 
reversal of passive and active action. ‘To love’ should not be understood as specifying 
either a subject or object of that love, or an identification with the universe, but the 
power to love as pure event:  
 
dégager le pur événement qui m’unit à ceux que j’aime, et qui ne m’attendent 
pas plus que je ne les attends, puisque seul l’événement nous attend, Eventum 
tantum. Faire un événement, si petit soit-il, la chose la plus délicate du monde, 
le contraire de faire un drame, ou de faire une histoire. (Deleuze and Parnet 
1996: 81)17  
 
As we can see, Deleuze pays close attention to language in the formulation of the pure 
event, substituting passives for actives, and nouns for verbs. Elsewhere, he again 
draws on the Stoics in their supplanting of the statement ‘the tree is green’ with ‘the 
tree greens’, thus rendering the event neither an attribute nor a quality, but the 
incorporeal predicate of a subject of the proposition, and putting manner in the place 
of essence (Deleuze 1988: 71-2; 1993b: 53). ‘The tree greens’, or ‘the greening of the 
tree’, is the language of the event, then, that serves to dislocate further the illusion of 
transcendence: ‘quand les substantifs et adjectifs se mettent à fondre, quand les noms 
d’arrêt et de repos sont entraînés par les verbes de pur devenir et glissent dans le 
langage des événements, toute identité se perd pour le moi, le monde et Dieu.’ 
(Deleuze 1969: 11)18   
 
 59 
 
In his reading of Leibniz, Deleuze takes the notion of the event one step 
further, suggesting that the universe itself might be viewed as pure event, an 
incorporeal, virtual predicate, which is included in every subject who then extracts 
from it those manners which correspond to points of view. As Deleuze explains, ‘Le 
monde est la prédication même, les manières sont les prédicats particuliers, et le sujet, 
ce qui passe d’un prédicat à un autre comme d’un aspect du monde à un autre’ 
(Deleuze 1988: 72).19 It is the concept of the fold that shapes Deleuze’s reading of 
Leibniz here, and which posits the universe in terms of continuous variation and 
difference. For Leibniz, matter is composed of an innumerable quantity of monads 
that have no parts, no doors nor windows, and yet contain the universe within them. 
The monad is thus a unity that envelops a multiplicity and that refuses the 
hierarchisation or organisation of parts, instead revealing matter through inflection, 
folds and pleats. The fold relies on what remains hidden, since the division between 
inside and outside depends on the very fact of the thing being folded, which in itself is 
neither inside nor outside. Unfolding thus involves opening up another fold. As 
Deleuze writes, ‘Plier-déplier ne signifie plus simplement tendre-détendre, contracter-
dilater, mais envelopper-développer, involuer-évoluer’ (Deleuze 1988: 13).20 Yet, at 
the same time, what is folded is always enveloped, and thus included. Folding 
remains a virtuality that only exists in that which envelops it (Deleuze 1988: 31; 
1993b: 22), and the fold thus provides another way to think through relations between 
the actual and the virtual, the subject and the universe. As Deleuze explains, 
 
le monde entier n’est qu’une virtualité qui n’existe actuellement que dans les 
plis de l’âme qui l’exprime, l’âme opérant des déplis intérieurs par lesquels elle 
se donne une représentation du monde incluse. Nous allons de l’inflexion à 
 60 
 
l’inclusion dans un sujet, comme du virtuel à l’actuel, l’inflexion définissant le 
pli, mais l’inclusion définissant l’âme ou le sujet, c’est-à-dire ce qui enveloppe 
le pli, sa cause finale et son acte achevé. (Deleuze 1988: 32)21 
 
In his theorisations of the a-subjective, the event and the fold, Deleuze thus 
formulates a philosophy that counters the given. As Alain Badiou explains, the fold 
offers a concept of the multiple as an irreducible ‘labyrinthine complexity’, an anti-
dialectic notion of the event, and an anti-Cartesian or anti-Lacanian concept of the 
subject. In Badiou’s words, ‘the fold allows us to conceive of an enunciation without 
“enouncement”, or of knowledge without object. The world as such will no longer be 
the fantasy of the All, but the pertinent hallucination of the inside as pure outside’ 
(Badiou 1994: 52).22 In its dislocation of essence, in reconfiguring relations between 
subject, object, universe and knowledge, and in the possibilities of counter-actualising 
the given through the event and in the continuous variations of the fold, Deleuze thus 
opens out experience beyond the illusion of transcendence.  
 
This book maintains that a Deleuzian philosophy has much to offer 
contemporary feminism in its moves beyond the transcendent relationship between 
subject and world, and towards a re-envisioning of subjectivity as the site of folds and 
flux. Though the notion of the a-subjective may imply incompatibility with feminism, 
this is only the case if ‘speaking as a woman’ involves being tied to an essentialist 
understanding of sexual difference, rather than acknowledging that the subject 
‘woman’ is, in Braidotti’s words ‘not a monolithic essence defined once and for all 
but rather the site of multiple, complex and potentially contradictory sets of 
experiences, defined by overlapping variables’ (Braidotti 1994a: 3-4). In its 
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theorisations of the a-subjective, the event and the fold, Deleuze’s philosophy of 
transcendental empiricism provides a starting point for thinking about counter-
actualising the given on the level of gender and embodiment. And as we shall see, 
these notions hold great resonance with articulations of female corporeality in 
contemporary women’s writing in French: in Darrieussecq’s writing, for example, 
which explodes conventional relations between mind, subject and universe in its 
exploration of the folds of consciousness, or in the work of Bouraoui, where we see 
the shaping and reshaping of subjectivity by the flux of immanent experience.   
 
But where does the a-subjective leave us in terms of locating the materiality, 
the shape and form of the body? In the last section of Le Pli, Deleuze considers the 
movements of the fold between essences and existences, between the inorganic and 
the organic, between the species of monads, and also in terms of its billowing 
between body and soul: ‘C’est un pli extrêmement sinueux, un zigzag, une liaison 
primitive non localisable’ (Deleuze 1988: 162).23 These relations require further 
consideration at this point. Within a philosophy of transcendental empiricism and 
incorporeal events, can a body be materialised, or does it remain tied, sinuously, to 
the virtual?  
 
Desire, the Body without Organs and Becoming 
 
The countering of transcendence in terms of the body itself is largely mobilised in 
Deleuzian philosophy in his collaborations with Félix Guattari, and in keeping with 
notions of folds and flux, relations between desire and the body are reconfigured 
along the plane of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of desire as 
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pure positivity allows for a critical reconceptualisation of its movements beyond the 
Oedipal family romance and the logic of lack that has governed psychoanalytical 
theory. Meanwhile, their theorisation of what they term ‘le Corps sans Organes’ (the 
Body without Organs), offers a way into thinking through bodily materiality and 
affect beyond the boundaries of the essentialised biological form and into the flux of 
becoming. On these counts, then, a feminist reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
thinking affords an understanding of contemporary corporeality in terms of vitality, 
flux and flow, rather than negativity, abjection, passivity and/or stasis. The corporeal 
question upon which Deleuzian philosophy hinges is not so much ‘what is a body?’, 
but ‘what can a body do?’ Thinking about the body’s capacity allows corporeality to 
be set free from its transcendent constraints. Yet in its perpetual movements of doing 
and undoing, it nonetheless remains to be seen whether one can maintain a grasp on 
the body, or whether it will inevitably slip out of reach and flow irrevocably into 
imperceptibility. 
 
In a radical and energetic departure from psychoanalytical frameworks, 
Deleuze and Guattari reconfigure desire both as pure positivity and as pre-personal. 
For the psychoanalytical thinkers Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, desire is always 
constituted out of a lack, turning on the search for a lost object. This object, primarily 
envisaged to be the mother, as the archetypal Other, is continuously deferred into a 
chain of unnameable, though self-signifying, desire. As Lacan explains,  
 
Le désir, fonction centrale à toute l’expérience humaine, est désir de rien de 
nommable. Et c’est ce désir qui est en même temps à la source de toute espèce 
d’animation. Si l’être n’était ce qu’il est, il n’y aurait même pas la place pour 
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qu’on en parle. L’être vient à exister en fonction même de ce manque. C’est en 
fonction de ce manque, dans l’expérience de désir, que l’être arrive à un 
sentiment de soi par rapport à l’être. C’est de la poursuite de cet au-delà qui 
n’est rien, qu’il revient au sentiment d’un être conscient de soi. (Lacan 1978: 
261-2)24  
 
In L’Anti-Œdipe, Deleuze and Guattari reverse the psychoanalytical formulation of 
the unconscious as a kind of ‘theatre’ which holds the key to the truth of desire, 
instead suggesting an immanent conception of the unconscious, which produces, 
rather than represents, desire. The central psychoanalytical figure of Oedipus, they 
argue, functions as a force that unites various forms of transcendence, normalising 
desire and forcing it into its own repression. Rather than turning on a vertical or 
nostalgic relation that wants to recuperate a missing object, then, desire according to 
Deleuze and Guattari takes on a lateral movement, taking neither subject nor object 
and collapsing this transcendent relation. Instead, desire is conceived as a principle of 
immanence that is formulated through productions and processes: 
 
homme et nature ne sont pas comme deux termes l’un en face de l’autre, même 
pris dans un rapport de causation, de compréhension (cause-effet, sujet-objet, 
etc), mais une seule et même réalité essentielle du producteur et du produit. La 
production comme processus déborde toutes les catégories idéales et forme un 
cycle qui se rapporte au désir en tant que principe immanent. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1972/3: 12)25  
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In Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of desire, the Freudian concept is thus 
reversed: desire is not something to be grasped or apprehended, rather to be produced. 
It is not something in front of which the subject can place itself, since its production 
occurs in its own perpetual movement of fluxes, connections and assemblages. 
Accordingly, Deleuze writes that the unconscious is a substance to be fabricated, to 
make flow. Desire does not aspire to attain pleasure, since, although pleasure may be 
agreeable, it in fact serves only to interrupt the processes of desire as constitution of a 
field of immanence (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 119; 2006: 74). Insofar as Deleuzian 
desire does not turn on lack, the fulfilment or resolution of pleasure cannot be its end 
goal. Desire, then, aims only towards its own proliferation and flux (Deleuze and 
Parnet 1996: 96-7; 2006: 58) and its movements are transversal, aleatory and 
nomadic: 
 
le désir n’a pas pour objet des personnes ou des choses, mais des milieux tout 
entiers qu’il parcourt, des vibrations et flux de toute nature qu’il épouse, en y 
introduisant des coupures, des captures, désir toujours nomade et migrant dont 
le caractère est d’abord le ‘gigantisme’. (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/3: 351-2)26  
  
Deleuzian desire, as pure positivity, as vibration and proliferation, is ultimately 
revolutionary, calling transcendent structures into question and calling for ever more 
connections and assemblages (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 96-7; 2006: 58). As such, 
sexuality itself can be understood as flux, as one flux among others, a flux that enters 
into a zone of proximity with other particles of flux (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 121; 
2006: 75). Sexuality, beyond psychoanalysis, is not formulated according to 
idealisation or phantasy, then, but in the proliferation of a thousand tiny sexes: ‘une 
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trans-sexualité microscopique, qui fait que la femme contient autant d’hommes que 
l’homme, et l’homme des femmes, capables d’entrer les uns avec les autres, dans des 
rapports de production de désir qui bouleversent l’ordre statistique des sexes’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972/3: 355-6).27 
 
Though Deleuzian desire is a free flow that both produces and exceeds bodies, 
the transcendent unity of the boundaried corporeal subject comes into being through 
the very organisation of desire. Assemblages of desiring-production, otherwise termed 
desiring machines, produce the body as an organism, but in its very production the 
body suffers from its organisation (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/3: 15-6; 2004a: 8). 
There arises thus a conflict between desiring machines that produce corporeality and 
the Corps sans Organes that resists the transcendent body. Following Antonin Artaud, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the CsO might be understood in terms of the 
body as event, as the counter-actualisation of the given. Though the CsO is a 
deterritorialised, destratified body, Deleuze and Guattari insist upon the fact that it 
does not involve negativity, nothingness or lack: ‘Le corps sans organes n’est pas le 
témoin d’un néant originel, pas plus que le reste d’une totalité perdue’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1972/3: 16).28 It is important to note that the CsO does not refuse the organs 
in themselves, but rather the concepts of the organism, and, crucially, of the 
organisation of the body. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, ‘Le CsO ne s’oppose pas 
aux organes, mais, avec ses “organes vrais” qui doivent être composés et placés, il 
s’oppose à l’organisme, à l’organisation organique des organes’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980: 196).29  
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The CsO, then, can be viewed as a whole, but it is a whole that does not unify 
or totalise its parts. In resisting its organs, and in refusing the organism and the 
organised, it marks the limit-point of pure multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/3: 
393; 2004a: 358). The CsO is what remains when everything else has been taken 
away, but it should not be interpreted as an empty vessel. Rather, its status as a 
surface is clearly highlighted, a surface that is populated with connections, flows, 
speeds and intensities. Often described as an egg, the CsO is crisscrossed with axes, 
gradients, longitudes, latitudes and passages. Its surface has nothing to do with the 
representation of a transcendent body, and everything to do with a material vitality: 
‘tout est vie et vécu’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/3: 28).30 As such, rather than the 
body existing in relation to desire, and despite its resistance to being produced as a 
transcendent body by desiring-machines, the CsO itself becomes desire: ‘Le CsO, 
c’est le champ d’immanence du désir, le plan de consistance propre au désir (là où le 
désir se définit comme processus de production, sans référence à aucune instance 
extérieure, manque qui viendrait le combler)’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 191, 
original italics).31 
 
In their movements away from psychoanalysis, lack and psychic depth, 
Deleuzian theorisations of desire and the CsO offer feminism ways of conceptualising 
corporeality as a surface of intersections and energies, of thinking about the limits and 
capabilities of the body, and of reconstituting subjectivity as affectivity through the 
material flux of desire beyond the limits of transcendence. As Braidotti writes, the 
body after Deleuze can be read as ‘the complex interplay of highly constructed social 
and symbolic forces: it is not an essence, let alone a biological substance, but a play 
of forces, a surface of intensities, pure simulacra without originals’ (Braidotti 2002: 
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21). Further, insofar as the female subject is no longer theorised through the ‘truth’ of 
the transcendent body (Colebrook 2000: 125-6), there is scope for the Deleuzian 
feminist to dispense with the notion of the given as being or as body and to think 
through corporeality in its various distributions: the anorexic body, for example, for 
Nothomb, the metamorphic body for Darrieussecq, the affective materiality of desire 
for Devi and Bouraoui. Rather than remaining anchored to stable, integral and 
integrated models, then, this book follows Deleuzian feminism in highlighting instead 
the affective ‘becoming’ of the body. 
 
The notion of ‘becoming’ itself courses through Deleuzian philosophy, in its 
toppling of Platonism and the foundations of ‘being’, and it requires closer attention 
here. Affirming becoming over being does not just mean acknowledging the value of 
the one over the other, but doing away with the binary distinction altogether. For 
Deleuze, bodies and states of affairs are neither unities nor totalities, but 
multiplicities. Multiplicity involves more than mere plurality: while plurality 
measures quantitative difference, multiplicities are rather conceived in terms of 
intensive differences (such as speeds). Multiplicity thus depends on internal 
difference, or, in other words, on what is in-between. As Deleuze writes in the preface 
to the English translation of Dialogues, 
 
In a multiplicity what counts are not the terms of the elements, but what is 
‘between’, the between, a set of relations which are not separable from each 
other. Every multiplicity grows from the middle, like the blade of grass or the 
rhizome. (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: vi-vii) 
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A multiplicity does not commence from a state of tabula rasa, or from a certain point, 
then, but emerges from the middle and is constituted by lines ‘of becomings without 
history, of individuation without subject’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: vii). Deleuzian 
becomings are not imitative or assimilative phenomena, and can be understood 
instead in terms of double capture, non-parallel evolution and of nuptials between two 
reigns (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 8; 2006: 2). Such nuptials, Deleuze is keen to stress, 
oppose the concept of the couple and are against nature insofar as they collapse the 
opposition of binary machines, rather than involving the transformation of one stark 
binary term (question, masculine, man) into another (answer, feminine, animal). 
Using the example of the orchid and the wasp, Deleuze develops this idea of 
becoming as a double capture, involving two things that have nothing to do with one 
another: 
 
L’orchidée a l’air de former une image de guêpe, mais en fait il y a un devenir-
guêpe de l’orchidée, un devenir-orchidée de la guêpe, une double capture 
puisque ‘ce que’ chacun devient ne change pas moins que ‘celui qui’ devient. 
La guêpe devient partie de l’appareil de reproduction de l’orchidée, en même 
temps que l’orchidée devient organe sexuel pour la guêpe. (Deleuze and Parnet 
1996: 8-9)32 
 
The becoming-orchid of the wasp and the becoming-wasp of the orchid thus coalesce 
into a single bloc of becoming that involves evolution in non-parallel terms. Rather, it 
involves involution, being in-between, ‘au milieu, adjacent’ (Deleuze and Parnet 
1996: 38).33  
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Deleuze employs the term ‘and’ to explicate further the in-between, in-the-
middle nature of becoming. The history of philosophy, he claims, is encumbered with 
the problem of being, and, playing on the homophony in the French, he argues that 
the ‘is’ should be substituted for the ‘and’: ‘Substituer le ET au EST. A et B’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 71).34 More than being a specific conjunction between 
terms, the ‘and’ subtends all relations, making them exceed their own terms. It 
explodes dualisms from the inside and traces a line of flight between two terms, 
‘l’étroit ruisseau qui n’appartient ni à l’un ni à l’autre, mais les entraîne tous les deux 
dans une évolution non parallèle, dans un devenir hétérochrone’ (Deleuze and Parnet 
1996: 43).35 In tracing lines of becoming, the ‘and’, as ‘extra-être, inter-être’, 
constitutes the multiplicity; thinking with ‘and’ rather than thinking ‘is’ or for ‘is’ 
thus lies at the heart of Deleuze’s empiricist philosophy (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 
71).36 
 
In becoming there is no past, future or even present, because there is no 
history. Becoming is thus a matter of transversal, or geographical linkages. Lewis 
Carroll’s Alice exists in an involuted state of becoming because she does not 
transform from one thing into another in a series of chronological movements. Rather, 
her becoming takes place transversally, as she becomes bigger and smaller in a 
simultaneity. As Deleuze writes, ‘le devenir ne supporte pas la séparation ni la 
distinction de l’avant et de l’après, du passé et du futur. Il appartient à l’essence du 
devenir d’aller, de tirer dans les deux sens à la fois. Alice ne grandit pas sans 
rapetisser, et inversement’ (Deleuze 1969: 9).37 Becoming slips away from the present 
and from the actual into the intermezzo. The movement and flight involved in 
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becoming is not about movement in actual terms, then. The figure of the nomad 
provides some helpful distinctions here: 
 
Le nomade a un territoire, il suit des trajets coûtumiers, il va d’un point à un 
autre, il n’ignore pas les points […] Un trajet est toujours entre deux points, 
mais l’entre-deux a pris toute la consistence, et jouit d’une autonomie comme 
d’une direction propre. La vie du nomade est intermezzo. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980: 471)38  
 
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between the migrant, who moves in actual terms 
from one point to another, and the nomad, who is instead always geographically in 
between locations. The nomad is thus not marked by movement, but by the very 
territory that lies in between two points. Nomadic becoming may involve trajectory, 
but trajectory takes place within the virtual multiplicity of the intermezzo. 
 
In keeping with the CsO, Deleuzian becoming seeks to undermine the 
transcendence of the subject, but it is worth thinking more carefully about how 
becoming itself might take place at the level of the human body. There are three 
specific examples of privileged sites of becoming which proliferate in Deleuzian 
philosophy and raise particular concerns with regard to the body and the possibility of 
a body politics: these are the notions of becoming-animal, becoming-woman and 
becoming-imperceptible. As an anti-anthropocentric encounter between terms that 
resists the transcendent logic of the human, becoming-animal does not mean that one 
merely assumes the behaviours of that animal, but enters into a mutually 
transformative relationship with it. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, ‘Un devenir n’est 
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pas une correspondance de rapports. Mais ce n’est pas plus une ressemblance, une 
imitation, et, à la limite, une identification’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 291).39 
Becomings are not masks based on imitation that can be assumed and discarded at 
will, but at the same time they should not be misunderstood as either dream or fantasy 
either. Deleuze and Guattari insist upon the point that becomings are ‘real’: ‘Le 
devenir-animal n’a rien de métaphorique. Aucun symbolisme, aucune allégorie’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1975: 65).40 Becomings are real in the sense that the bloc of 
becoming exists on its own terms, without being qualified by the purportedly fixed 
terms of either ‘human’ or ‘animal’. Becoming-animal is thus not a matter of vertical 
or historical evolution, in terms of filiation or descendence, but a sideways alliance, 
or, rather, mutation: a virtual transformation in the perception of difference. 
Becoming-wolf, or wolfing (lupellement), resists the transcendence of the boundaried 
subject and allows for the apprehension of multiplicity. This Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to as deterritorialisation: ‘Devenir loup, devenir trou, c’est se déterritorialiser, 
d’après des lignes distinctes enchêvetrées’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 45).41  
 
Just as they argue for becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari contend that the 
notion of becoming-woman does not involve the mere imitation of the female form 
but a movement towards a minoritarian position that resists the logic of 
transcendence. It is for this very reason, they argue, that becoming-man is impossible, 
since the concept of man implies a subject around which other things are organised. 
Deleuze and Guattari claim that since the concept of man can only ever occupy a 
majoritarian position, states of becoming must thus always be concerned with the 
opposite: ‘il n’y a pas de devenir-homme parce que l’homme est l’entité molaire par 
excellence, tandis que les devenirs sont moléculaires’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 
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358).42 Becoming-woman is thus a movement that takes place along the molecular 
plane, in opposition to being-a-woman which is distinctly molar. While the molar 
regulates and stratifies social identities within binary constructs, the molecular 
comprises the flux and micro-particles of the plane of immanence. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, becoming-woman involves the production of micro-femininities along a 
molecular plane that evades or disrupts the stratifying rigidity of the binary codes that 
are imposed by molar lines. To become-woman is to open out these processes of 
change and reorganisation in a movement away from the molar and majoritarian and 
towards the molecular and the minoritarian; it is not to be female, but to create micro-
femininities: ‘émettre des particules qui entrent dans le rapport du mouvement et de 
repos, ou dans la zone de voisinage d’une micro-féminité, c’est-à-dire produire en 
nous-mêmes une femme moléculaire, créer la femme moléculaire’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980: 338).43 Becoming-woman is thus a process of destratification and 
demassification, the very destabilisation of female molar identity.  
 
To become is not to acquire a form through identification, mimesis or 
imitation, then, and ultimately it leads to a plane of immanence: ‘la zone de voisinage, 
indiscernabilité ou d’indifférenciation telle qu’on ne peut plus se distinguer d’une 
femme, d’un animal ou d’une molécule’ (Deleuze 1993a: 11, original italics).44 This 
plane of immanence is a space of indifferentiation and indiscernability. If becoming-
woman is posited as the key to all becomings, the processes of becoming eventually 
give rise to the flux of the real and to becoming-imperceptible: ‘Se réduire à une ligne 
abstraite, un trait, pour trouver sa zone d’indiscernabilité avec d’autres traits, et entrer 
dans l’heccéité comme dans l’impersonnalité de créateur’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980: 343).45 In entering into a hecceity, becoming-imperceptible involves immanent 
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and molecular perception, and absolute indifferentiability. In that sense, it brings us 
back to the a-subjectivity with which we began. Subject and world fold into one 
another, and their interconnectedness constitutes the multiplicity. As Tamsin Lorraine 
observes, such a model ‘evokes an image of collaboration of embodied subject and 
world, a singular coming together of multiple lines in which the specific location and 
shape of the subject is impossible to pin down to any one point’ (Lorraine 1999: 126). 
 
The undoing of specificity, boundaries and transcendence allows feminism 
after Deleuze to think through embodiment as a process of materialisation. It allows 
for an understanding of the situatedness of the body, in the sense of its becoming 
through a multiplicity of intersecting forces and its interconnectedness with the 
material flux of the world, but also for an understanding of the movements of that 
very situatedness, of its transience. The chapters that follow will see the unfolding of 
the body into perpetual becoming: becoming-child in Nothomb, becoming-molecular 
in Devi, becoming-animal in Darrieussecq, becoming-nomadic in Bouraoui. In these 
works, a vital and dynamic conception of female corporeality is mobilised that 
liberates the body beyond the confines of the self-identical and the transcendent. But, 
as we shall see, the collapsing of specificity into absolute difference and 
imperceptibility nonetheless arguably raises concerns for anything that we might 
think of as a grounded feminist politics. 
 
Difference: Politics, Philosophy, Literature 
 
The becoming of the body according to Deleuze does not involve the iteration of the 
same, but takes place in a relation of repetition and absolute difference. Deleuzian 
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difference overturns the conventional Aristotelian principle wherein difference is 
produced between two terms in relation to something that they already have in 
common. Deleuze conceives instead of a concept of absolute difference, in which 
difference is not relative to that which is identical: 
 
Que l’identité n’est pas primaire, qu’elle existe comme principe, mais comme 
second principe, comme principe devenu; qu’elle tourne autour du Différent, 
telle est la nature d’une révolution copernicienne qui ouvre à la différence la 
possibilité de son concept propre, au lieu de la maintenir sous la domination 
d’un concept en général posé comme identique. (Deleuze 1968: 59, original 
italics)46 
 
If difference is only understood with reference to what is self-identical, it will 
necessarily be given a negative dimension, Deleuze argues, since it will be identified 
purely in terms of not being something else which is. A concept of absolute 
difference, on the other hand, must have no sense of mediation by the identical. It 
must refer to other differences that do not identify it but rather differentiate it: 
‘Chaque chose, chaque être doit voir sa propre identité engloutie dans la différence, 
chacun n’étant plus qu’une différence entre des différences. Il faut montrer la 
différence allant différant’ (Deleuze 1968: 79, original italics).47  
 
Deleuzian difference as intensive, and as internal to itself, enables feminism 
insofar as it allows for a conception of sexual difference beyond an external binary 
that necessarily rests on a principle of identity. Such a conception might instead think 
through difference in terms of the ‘play of multiple differences that structure the 
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subject’ that are ‘neither harmonious nor homogenous, but rather internally 
differentiated’ (Braidotti 2002: 28). Further, thinking through sexual difference in 
terms of intensive difference, and looking to different bodily distributions and 
behaviours that posit ‘different responses to the given within the given’ (Colebrook 
2000: 125), allows sexual difference itself to be considered as a problem rather than a 
given. As Colebrook argues, ‘if sexual difference is not theorised from a metaphysics, 
but is confronted as a problem, then we might take the issues of sexual difference and 
use them to think’ (Colebrook 2000: 126, original italics). The becoming of the body 
as always perpetually other than itself thus necessitates the thinking through of sexual 
difference as a problem that strains away from its resolution.  
 
But it is at the two limit-points of becoming – becoming-woman as the key to 
all becomings and becoming-imperceptible as the end of all becomings – that the 
tensions of a Deleuzian conception of corporeality for the purposes of a feminist 
politics of difference are patent. As we have seen, the concept of becoming-woman 
has proved a particular point of contention for feminists such as Irigaray and Jardine, 
who argue that taking ‘woman’ as the starting point for becoming necessarily works 
towards the invisibilisation of femininity. Deleuzian feminists too find it difficult to 
reconcile Deleuze’s use of terms here. On the one hand, insofar as becoming-woman 
involves interrogating molar roles of femininity, it would seem to constitute a 
welcome sense of resistance to the binary polarisation that privileges men at the 
expense of women. At the same time, the concept raises problems for feminism 
precisely because Deleuze neglects to take into account the position from which one 
is becoming. Even as Deleuze acknowledges becoming-woman as a move towards the 
minoritarian, and as such seemingly acknowledges the position of women themselves 
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as existing in a minority, he seems at the same time to obscure that very position. In 
other words, becoming-molecular-woman rather than being-a-woman may indeed 
prove enabling, but exactly what it involves may differ depending on the position 
from which one is becoming (Grosz 1994b: 207). As Braidotti notes, ‘Deleuze 
proceeds as if there was clear equivalence in the speaking positions of the sexes: he 
misses and consequently fails to take into account the central point of feminism’  
(Braidotti 2002: 79, original italics). One might make the case that Deleuze is not 
exactly claiming a specifically feminist stance here, that becoming-woman takes part 
in a wider series of becoming-minoritarian, and, indeed, that the whole of Deleuzian 
philosophy is governed by the refusal of specific subject positions anyway, including 
those that indicate sexual identity. Nonetheless that becoming-woman is posited as 
the ‘key’ to becoming seems both significant and unsettling. As I shall go on to 
discuss further below, one of the principal difficulties of reconciling a Deleuzian 
philosophy with any kind of conventional or molar identity politics lies in its 
resistance to a stable subject position. And yet, in limiting the becoming-otherwise of 
gender to the concept of ‘becoming-woman’, in disallowing a becoming-man, and 
thinking merely in terms of reversing the binary, Deleuze would seem somehow 
almost to be participating in its reiteration. As Lorraine (1999: 187) argues, ‘labeling 
a becoming “becoming-woman” is already to trade in stereotypes that the move from 
identity politics to a micropolitics was meant to counter if the possibility of the 
becoming-man of woman as well as the becoming-woman of man is excluded.’ 
Despite the argument for a spectrum of thousand tiny sexes, the specific and 
constrained use of terminology with regard to becoming-woman would seem 
strangely caught between the conditions of two limit-points: on the one hand, 
invisibilising femininity as an entry-point to the imperceptible, and on the other, 
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seeming to rehearse a binary, assymetrical logic that is cast back to the molar. As a 
concept, becoming-woman will be under particular scrutiny in the chapters that 
follow, and its mobilisations in literature indicate both the stranglehold of particular 
conceptions of femininity on the female body and as well as the possibilities for a 
micro-politics that it might otherwise reveal. 
 
There are further concerns for a feminist politics that assemble around the 
limit-points of becoming. For, while a Deleuzian philosophy of absolute difference 
read in feminist terms might open out intensive and internal difference, for 
Deleuze absolute difference is in the end irrevocably tied to indifferentiation, 
indiscernability and imperceptibility. While the appeal of the concepts of 
becoming-otherwise and counter-actualising the given endures, the question for the 
Deleuzian feminist remains: how far can one go towards imperceptibility before 
losing oneself entirely? How far can one experiment with making oneself a Body 
without Organs? Deleuze and Guattari push at the limit: ‘Allons encore plus loin, 
nous n’avons pas encore trouvé notre CsO, pas assez défait notre moi’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980: 187).48 Countering transcendence seems to necessitate living on 
the edge, experimenting in anorexia, alcoholism or schizophrenia. Self-
annihilation, or overdose, may well be a danger (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 198-
9; 2004b: 177-8), but Deleuze advocates going just far enough, just enough to 
widen the crack, without falling into it completely. Lorraine (1999: 135) argues 
that, despite Deleuze’s insistence on molecular becoming, ‘one does not get the 
impression from reading his work that he really intends to disappear’. Indeed, there 
is an insistence upon caution, or the art of dosages, and Deleuze and Guattari 
appear to provide parameters that would avoid losing oneself entirely: ‘On n’y va 
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pas à coups de marteau, mais avec une lime très fine. On invente des 
autodestructions qui ne se confondent pas avec la pulsion de mort’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980: 198).49 But precisely how such criteria are upheld is rather less 
obvious, and this book will be concerned with seeking out the edges of female 
corporeality and thinking about where the limit might be located. 
 
A philosophy that pushes at the edges of existence cannot easily be 
reconciled with any kind of politics in the conventional sense. Thinking about 
politics after Deleuze, then, requires being open to the deconstruction of very idea 
of identity politics, highlighting not only the flux of identity but recognising the 
contingent nature of politics too.50 Indeed, interrogating the essentialism of the 
idea of identity politics is resonant with recent feminism more broadly, in 
particular in the work of theorists such as Judith Butler or Diana Fuss.51 For 
Deleuzian feminists, deconstructing molar politics involves thinking through the 
possibilities of becoming-minoritarian in the terms of a micro-politics of desire. 
For desire, as we have seen, is ultimately revolutionary and through its flows and 
assemblages it has the capacity to transform and to destabilise the molar. 
Accordingly, Braidotti (2002: 84) argues for a ‘becoming-nomad’ as ‘undoing the 
oppositional dualism of majority/minority and arousing an affirmative passion for 
the transformative flows that destabilise all identities’. A micro-politics thus goes 
beyond the logic of reversibility towards a Deleuzian a-subjective that transforms 
notions of individuality, where becoming is a ‘trans-personal mode, ultimately 
collective’ (Braidotti 2002: 85). For many feminists, grounding a politics after 
Deleuze also involves mapping different positions, tempering Deleuze with a more 
recognisable form of (identity) politics, or with psychoanalytical concepts that give 
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some semblance of shape or form to Deleuzian vitality.52 Interestingly, then, a 
feminist micro-politics of difference involves engaging in creative reading and 
writing strategies, setting Deleuzian philosophy in motion as a means to forge a 
new feminism.  
 
Creating dialogues between literary articulations of female corporeality and 
Deleuzian philosophy, this book intends to open out further questions about the 
possible politics of the becoming of the body. Questions concerning the literary 
itself – reading, writing, creativity and art – become crucial at this point. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the three forms of thought – philosophy, 
science, and art – are equally creative in their different ways of confronting the 
infinity of the universe with the aim of tracing a map. While science renounces the 
infinite through the process of referential propositions and partial observations, 
philosophy is open to immanence and to the creation of the infinite. The 
relationship of art to the infinite is more reflexive and intertwined: ‘L’art veut créer 
du fini qui redonne l’infini: il trace un plan de composition, qui porte à son tour 
des monuments ou des sensations composées sous l’action de figures esthétiques’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 186).53 Art struggles against chaos but with the result 
of being able to cast light into it and allowing the virtual to be experienced: ‘L’art 
lutte effectivement avec le chaos, mais pour y faire surgir une vision qui l’illumine 
un instant, une Sensation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 192).54 For Deleuze and 
Guattari, art is not representation, nor does it have an opinion. Art intertwines with 
the flux of immanence and unravels the organisation of transcendent perception, 
creating affect and sensation. It is a becoming in the sense that it reaches beyond 
its own terms and enfolds the virtual, rather than representing the actual: ‘Le 
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devenir est une capture, une possession, une plus-value, jamais une reproduction 
ou une imitation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1975: 25).55 Art thus involves an 
interaction of the actual and the virtual, insofar as it traverses immanence and 
allows life in its fullest sense to grasped or experienced through sensation. Writing, 
or literature, can be understood as a flow through immanence that touches the 
actual and the virtual. As Deleuze writes, ‘Ecrire est une affaire de devenir, 
toujours inachevé, toujours en train de se faire, et qui déborde toute matière 
vivable ou vécu. C’est un processus, c’est-à-dire un passage de Vie qui traverse le 
vivable et le vécu.’ (Deleuze 1993a: 11)56 
 
It is in an understanding of art as an interrelation of the actual and the 
virtual that this book proceeds. It conceives of writing, above all, as a site of 
slippage. In the chapters that follow, it will be argued that literary articulations of 
the becoming of the body touch upon the flux of immanence, creating new forms 
of the body that traverse the actual and the virtual and experimenting with the 
edges of corporeality. As an art form, literature will of course offer more scope for 
the creative experimentation with the shape and form of the female body, and a 
Deleuzian philosophy of pushing at the limit will be easier to reconcile with 
literary experiment in women’s writing than with a feminist conception of the 
materiality of experience. But in analysing forms of female corporeality, the 
chapters that follow are concerned precisely with testing further the relations 
between the actual and the virtual, between Deleuze and feminism, and between art 
and experience. As outlined in the introduction, the writers that I analyse in 
subsequent chapters do not write with a particular feminist politics in mind. If 
Deleuzian philosophy provides a fertile set of concepts with which to think through 
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their creative re-envisionings of corporeality, one can also perceive reflections 
between these writers and Deleuze in their ambivalent attitudes towards 
embodiment, disembodiment and the location of the limit. The book is thus 
interested in exploring that ambivalence within the postfeminist context of 
contemporary women’s writing in French sketched in the introduction. It will also 
linger upon whether, despite the vital creativity of their imaginings, such writings 
may end up mobilising Deleuzian visions of experience around deterritorialisation, 
dissipation and flight, that, as Peter Hallward (2006: 162) has argued  ‘can only 
offer the most immaterial and evanescent grip on the mechanisms of exploitation 
and domination that continue to condition so much of what happens in our world’.  
 
Interestingly, for all of Deleuze’s insistence on encounters and on the creation 
of new concepts, his own practice of reading literature seems somehow to resist the 
openness to thought that his entire philosophy engenders. As Colin Davis argues, 
Deleuze’s acts of literary interpretation are presented as a rather resolute and 
repetitive insistence on a particular set of rehearsed (Deleuzian) concepts. In his 
readings of Proust and Kafka, it is certainly striking that, in Davis’s (2010: 79) words: 
‘He seems to learn little that is new from the creators to whom he nevertheless attends 
in such careful detail.’ This book hopes not to fall into a similar trap, and intends to 
open out perspectives on female corporeality without reducing the creativity of 
different writers, texts and concepts to a resolute paradigm. My readings of the female 
body in subsequent chapters will address different aspects of Deleuzian philosophy, 
then, rather than overstating an absolute resonance for each author with a more global 
conception of his thought. Further, my readings of literary texts aim to instantiate the 
ways in which a Deleuzian vocabulary resonates with articulations of female 
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corporeality, but also to address its possible insufficiencies in terms of theorising the 
becoming of the body.  
 
For Deleuze, if art has no opinion, it nonetheless contains a micro-political 
function insofar as it helps to avert the illusion of transcendence through its counter-
actualisation. The writer him/herself is always minoritarian, not necessarily in that 
s/he belongs to a minority, but that writing always encounters a minority that does not 
write. Though the writer does not write on this minority’s behalf, there is an 
encounter, ‘où chacun pousse l’autre, l’entrâine dans sa ligne de fuite, dans une 
déterritorialisation conjuguée’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 56).57 Writing thus involves 
composition and counterpoint, connection and encounter. In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1991: 178) words, ‘Le contrepoint ne sert pas à rapporter des conversations, réelles 
ou fictives, mais à faire monter la folie de toute conversation, de tout dialogue, même 
intérieur.’58 Literary counterpoint entails the intertwining of creative encounters that 
form a collective. As Ian Buchanan and John Marks explain: 
 
Ultimately, the political task of writing consists in ‘inventing’ a people who do 
not yet exist. In the same way that writers do not write with their ego, so they do 
not write on behalf of a people. The collective emerges, in this way, from the 
writer’s creation of pre-individual singularities. The ‘collective’, in Deleuzian 
terms, is a form of ‘delirium’, speaking with, writing with. (Buchanan and 
Marks 2000: 2, original italics) 
 
This book suggests that, though the authors under study do not write from a clearly 
positioned feminist politics, their articulations of female corporeality nonetheless 
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mobilise in writing an encounter with the political through the very invention of the 
new and the interfacing of the actual and the virtual. Further, the book itself aims to 
participate in a strategy of ‘speaking with, writing with’. If Deleuzian feminists have 
engaged creatively with Deleuze as a means to think through a contemporary politics 
of difference, this book too wants to map encounters between different positions, and 
in its particular engagement with the literary, it aims to open out its own political 
interventions. Such a rhizomatic strategy, or epistemic nomadism as Braidotti (1994b: 
177) terms it, would seem crucial to contemporary feminism in an engagement with 
thought beyond its own particular terms, ‘going between different discursive fields, 
passing through diverse spheres of intellectual discourse […] moving on, passing 
through, creating connections where things were previously disconnected or seemed 
unrelated, where there seemed to be “nothing to see”. In transit, moving, 
displacing…’ In this book, then, reading is conceived as a creative and rhizomatic act. 
The book seeks to unearth crosscurrents and connections, allowing the literary, the 
philosophical and the political to inflect one another in its consideration of the 
becoming of the body in contemporary women’s writing in French. In so doing, it 
conceives of both writing and of reading, after Deleuze, not as a mimetic, 
representational act that fixes meaning or that submits to ideological constraints, but 
as an agentive, aleatory and creative connection to the immanence of experience. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s words: ‘La littérature est un agencement, elle n’a rien à voir 
avec de l’idéologie […] Écrire n’a rien à voir avec signifer, mais avec arpenter, 
cartographier, même des contrées à venir’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: 10-11).59 
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1 ‘Philosophy is the theory of multiplicities, each of which is composed of actual and 
virtual elements. Purely actual objects do not exist. Every actual surrounds itself with 
a cloud of virtual images.’ (Deleuze 2006: 112) 
2 ‘To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no 
longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will 
know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b: 3-4) 
3 From this chapter onwards, reference will be made to a range of sole-authored and 
collaborative works by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. To avoid clumsy and 
confusing phrasing, I will generally refer to ‘Deleuze’ and to ‘Deleuzian’ theories; but 
where specific texts or concepts pertain to co-authored works, I will refer to ‘Deleuze 
and Guattari’ and to ‘DeleuzoGuattarian’ theories. Of course, there will inevitably be 
some slippage here. 
4 My approach is in keeping with literary critics such as Françoise Lionnet (1989: 27), 
among others, in its concern not to impose a ‘theoretical grid’ on the literary text. But 
it also resonates, as we shall see, with a Deleuzian philosophy of encounters and 
rhizomatic reading. 
5 ‘philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts’. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 2) 
6 ‘it is about getting something through in every past, present, and future code, 
something which does not and will not let itself be recorded. Getting it through on a 
new body, inventing a body on which it can pass and flow: a body that would be ours, 
the body of Earth, the body of writing.’ (Deleuze 2004a: 253) 
7 ‘one day, perhaps, the century will be Deleuzian’. 
8 Published by Edinburgh University Press, under the series editor Ian Buchanan. 
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9 ‘isn’t it necessary to have had a relation of language and sex to the organs – that 
women have never had?’ (Irigaray 1985: 141) 
10 See Colebrook 2000, 2009; Braidotti 1994a, 1994b, 2000, 2002; Grosz 1994a, 
1994b, 1995, 1999, 2008; Lorraine 1999; Olkowski 1999, 2000. 
11 ‘From what is given, I infer the existence of that which is not given: I believe. […] 
At the same time and though the same operation, while transcending the given, I 
judge and posit myself as subject. I affirm more than I know.’ (Deleuze 1991: 85-6) 
12 ‘In itself, the mind is not subject: it is a given collection of impressions and separate 
ideas.’ (Deleuze 1991: 132) 
13 ‘The mind is not subject; it is subjected. When the subject is constituted in the mind 
under the effect of principles, the mind apprehends itself as a self, for it has been 
qualified.’ (Deleuze 1991: 31) 
14 ‘when its vividness is mobilized in such away that the part characterized by 
vividness (impression) communicates it to another part (idea), and also, when all the 
parts taken together resonate in the act of producing something new.’ (Deleuze 1991: 
132, original italics) 
15 ‘a shadowy and secret part that is continually subtracted from or added to its 
actualization: in contrast with the state of affairs, it neither begins or ends but has 
gained or kept the infinite movement to which it gives consistency.’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 156) 
16 ‘My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it!’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 
49) 
17 ‘extracting the pure event which unites me with those whom I love, who await me 
no more than I await them, since the event alone awaits us, Eventum tantum. Making 
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an event – however small – is the most delicate thing in the world: the opposite of 
making a drama or making a story.’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 49) 
18 ‘when substantives and adjectives begin to dissolve, when the names of pause and 
rest are carried away by the verbs of pure becoming and slide into the language of 
events, all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God.’ (Deleuze 2004b: 5) 
19 ‘The world is predication itself, manners being the particular predicates, and the 
subject, what goes from one predicate to another as if from one aspect of the world to 
another.’ (Deleuze 1993b: 53) 
20 ‘Folding-unfolding no longer simply means tension-release, contraction-dilation, 
but enveloping-developing, involution-evolution.’ (Deleuze 1993b: 8) 
21 ‘the whole world is only a virtuality that currently exists only in the folds of the 
soul which convey it, the soul implementing inner pleats through which it endows 
itself with a representation of the enclosed world. We are moving from inflection to 
inclusion in a subject, as if from the virtual to the real, inflection defining the fold, but 
inclusion defining the soul or the subject, that is what envelops the fold, its final cause 
and its completed act.’ (Deleuze 1993b: 23) 
22 See also Badiou’s critique of Deleuze in Badiou 1997. 
23 ‘It is an extremely sinuous fold, a zigzag, a primal tie that cannot be located.’ 
(Deleuze 1993b: 120) 
24 ‘Desire, a function central to all human experience, is the desire for nothing 
nameable. And at the same time this desire lies at the origin of every variety of 
animation. If being were only what it is, there wouldn’t even be room to talk about it. 
Being comes into existence as an exact function of this lack. Being attains a sense of 
self in relation to being as a function of this lack, in the experience of desire. In the 
pursuit of this beyond, which is nothing, it harks back to the feeling of a being with 
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self-consciousness, which is nothing but its own reflection in the world of things.’ 
(Lacan 1991: 223-4) 
25 ‘man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other – not even 
in the sense of bipolar opposites within a relationship of causation, ideation, or 
expression (cause and effect, subject and object, etc); rather they are one and the same 
essential reality, the producer-product. Production as process overtakes all idealistic 
categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an immanent 
principle.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 5) 
26 ‘desire does not take as its object persons or things, but the entire surroundings that 
it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined, introducing 
therein breaks and captures – an always nomadic and migrant desire, characterized 
first of all by its “gigantism”.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 322) 
27 ‘a microscopic transsexuality, resulting in the woman containing as many men as 
the man, and the man as many women, all capable of entering – men with women, 
women with men – into relations of production of desire that overturn the statistical 
order of the sexes.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 325)  
28 ‘The body without organs is not the proof of an original nothingness, nor is it what 
remains of a lost totality.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 9) 
29 ‘The BwO is not opposed to the organs; rather, the BwO and its “true organs,” 
which must be composed and positioned, are opposed to the organism, the organic 
organization of the organs.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 176)  
30 ‘it is all life and lived experience’. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 21) 
31 ‘The BwO is the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency specific to 
desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to any 
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exterior agency, whether it be lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it).’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 170-1) 
32 ‘The orchid seems to form a wasp image, but in fact there is a wasp-becoming of 
the orchid, and orchid-becoming of the wasp, a double capture since ‘what’ each 
becomes changes no less than ‘that which’ becomes. The wasp becomes part of the 
orchid’s reproductive apparatus at the same time as the orchid becomes the sexual 
organ of the wasp.’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 2) 
33 ‘in the middle, adjacent’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 22). 
34 ‘Substitute the AND for IS. A and B.’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 42) 
35 ‘the narrow stream which belongs to the one nor to the other, but draws both into a 
non-parallel evolution, into a heterochronous becoming (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 
26).  
36 ‘extra-being, inter-being’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 43). 
37 ‘becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or 
of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both 
directions at once: Alice does not grow without shrinking, and vice versa.’ (Deleuze 
2004b: 3) 
38 ‘The nomad has a territory; he follows customary paths; he goes from one point to 
another; he is not ignorant of points […] A path is always between two points, but the 
in-between has taken on all the consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a 
direction of its own. The life of the nomad is the intermezzo.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b: 419) 
39 ‘A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a 
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b: 262) 
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40 ‘There is nothing metaphoric about the becoming-animal. No symbolism, no 
allegory.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 35) 
41 ‘To become wolf or to become hole is to deterritorialize oneself following distinct 
but entangled lines.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 36) 
42 ‘There is no becoming-man because man is the molar entity par excellence, 
whereas becomings are molecular.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 322) 
43 ‘emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of 
proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular 
woman, create the molecular woman.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 304) 
44 ‘the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferentiation where one can no 
longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule’. (Deleuze 1997: 1, 
original italics) 
45 ‘To reduce oneself to an abstract line, a trait, in order to find one’s zone of 
indiscernibility with other traits, and in this way enter the hacceity and impersonality 
of the creator.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 309) 
46 ‘That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a 
principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a 
Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own 
concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general 
already understood as identical.’ (Deleuze 1994: 40-1, original italics) 
47 ‘Every object, every thing must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, 
each being no more than a difference between differences. Difference must be shown 
differing.’ (Deleuze 1994: 56, original italics) 
48 ‘Let’s go further still, we haven’t found our BwO yet, we haven’t sufficiently 
dismantled our self.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 167) 
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49 ‘ You don’t do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file. You invent self-
destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive.’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 
2004b: 177) 
50 See Patton 2000 and Protevi 2001 for accounts of the deconstructive relationship 
between Deleuze and politics more broadly. 
51 Diana Fuss (1989: 104-5), for example, calls into question the view that, in order 
for feminism to be politically effective, political identities themselves must 
necessarily be secure and coherent. Further, she seeks to undermine the idea that 
politics must be ‘steady and localizable’, a notion that she believes itself can easily 
lead to ‘disaffection and political factiousness’. Similarly, Judith Butler (2004: 224-6) 
argues that any kind of social transformation must entail the recognition of its own 
instability and must maintain a continual process of reworking, such that it emerges 
‘anew as a result of the cultural translations it undergoes’. For Butler, politically 
transformative work is necessarily based on uncertainty as to the future, on openness 
and unknowingness, and on an awareness that a certain agonism and contestation 
must be in play for politics to be democratic. 
52 Braidotti 2002, Lorraine 1999 and Olkowski 2000, for example, are interested in 
tracing lines between Deleuze and Irigaray, while Grosz 1994a and Driscoll 2000 
track relations between Kristeva and Deleuze. Braidotti’s work (1996; 2006) also 
interweaves Deleuze with the cyberfeminism of thinkers such as Donna Haraway. 
53 ‘Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite: it lays out a plane of 
composition that, in turns, through the action of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or 
composite sensations.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 197) 
54 ‘Art indeed struggles with chaos, but it does so in order to bring forth a vision that 
illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 204) 
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55 ‘The act of becoming is a capturing, a possession, a plus-value, but never a 
reproduction or an imitation.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 13) 
56 ‘Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of 
being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. It is a 
process, that is, a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and the lived.’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 1) 
57 ‘in which each pushes the other, draws it on to its line of flight in a combined 
deterritorialization.’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 33) 
58 ‘Counterpoint serves not to report real or fictional convesrations but to bring out the 
madness of all conversation and all dialogue, even interior dialogue.’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 188) 
59 ‘Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology […] Writing has 
nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping even realms that 
are yet to come.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b: 4-5)        
